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AN ANALYSIS OF MARRIAGE TRENDS AND
DIVORCE POLICIES
ROBERT S. REDMOUNT*

Divorce law, theoretically, is the embodiment of policies governing
the dissolution of marriage. It is the legal expression of the values
attached to marriage and implicitly states the law's understanding of
the marital relationship, at least that part of it that reflects conflict
and disturbance.
The analytic discourse which follows briefly assesses the roles and
meanings of marriage, the sources and consequences of marital disharmony and the complications of marriage dissolution. The history
and composition of divorce policies and laws is carefully savored and
sharply scrutinized for fidelity to the reason and experience of marriage. The outcome of this analysis has the purpose of better orienting
legal policy.
MARRIAGE TRENDS

From a legal perspective marriage is a mode for the organization
and control of behavior in society. It has served to formalize patterns
of sexual relationship and channelize the expression of biological needs
so as to minimize the challenge to social order of incessant rivalry
and strife. It has afforded a vehicle for the distribution of property
and for the determination of privileges and responsibilities in its use.
It has served as a unit for economic organization, exploitation and
development. It has regularly been the primary tool for acculturation,
for the social, moral and ethical development of the individual. It
has provided the education and the tools necessary for assimilation into
society. And, marriage has been an agreement, with God or with
society, to regularize the function of procreation and insure the perpetuation of the human race.
Clearly, marriage has been more than, or something other than,
romance. It has been an implicit social compact between people and
the political order to undertake to share the burdens of living in a
society.' Derivatively, it has been a means of private gratification, but
mostly, it has been a matter of social responsibility.
The comprehensive social and legal function of marriage has been
obscured by the pursuit of certain emphases in a particular epoch, and
* Research Associate, Yale Law School.
1. This formulation fits the philosophical frame of Rousseau.

Indeed,

developments in modern human behavior create an experimental laboratory
in which the aptness of the "social contract" theory can be tested. See
particularly pp. 524-26 infra and cf. RoussEAu, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762).

513

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 10

by the failure to become sensitized to a pattern of change and evolution coursing over the length of time. The role of marriage has not been
static in the midst of great upheavals and great change in patterns of
societal development and social relationship.
Marriageand Property
Property is the classical concept for splitting or sharing resources and defining power and control.2 It is hoary with a
tradition extending back into the earliest testaments of civilization. 3
Marriage has long been the medium for maintaining the integrity and
perpetuating the ownership of property within a distinct and stable
unit of social organization-the family. It has become part of an
institutional process for the determination of successor interests and
the planned utilization of property, helping to create social boundaries
and social meanings. It is the children born of a marriage, or certain
of them, who have had the benefit and the burden of perpetuating
the ownership and use of property. They, as the successors in
interest, were the surviving ego of the original owner and inherited
his rights and powers. Marriage and the family provided the trustees
for property,4 and the conditions of stability and regularity that
enabled its organization and development. Indeed, families and marriage became the creatures of property.
However, the emphasis upon marriage as a vehicle of property has
been epochal and transitional, not absolute and perhaps not permanent.
In a societal form where there are no other well-developed social units
such as the family, or where there has been deterioration in other
social organization, the family may become, by default, the means
and expression of many social objectives. Minimal technological
development, and primitive and cumbersome modes of transportation
and communication, fiecessitate the predominant localization of economic development and organization. The deterioration or non-existence of strong political and governmental units, geographically
organized, also devolves upon a "family" concept the entire responsibility for the protection of wealth and property. The control and
use of property in these circumstances is a preeminent function of a
clan, or family-type grouping such as the medieval manor.5
2. The psychological function of property in defining relationships and developing identifications is the subject of a treatise by BEAGLEHOLE, PROPERTY:
A STUDY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1932).

3. The evolution of property is traced through different cultures and forms
of social organization by LETOURNEAU, PROPERTY: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT (1892). Letourneau reflects on its role in the life of lower animals,
and traces it through ancient and modern civilizations.

4. The "trustee" concept of the family is evolved by Zimmerman in his
analysis of the evolutionary development, or retrogression, of family struc-

ture and purpose. ZIMMERMAN, FAMILY AND CIVILIZATION (1947).
5. Property itself has been a vehicle in society with different meanings in
different areas of political and economic experience. Hence, the role of family
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The development of science and technology, of transportation and
communication media, has resulted in a new epoch and a gradual
redefinition of the role and function of property. Conceived in a new
and changed set of social circumstances, the value attached to the
ownership of property becomes subsidiary to the value attached to
the development and use of property. 6 Economic development and
organization transcends the traditional family approach in the ownership and use of property, and may be unbounded by traditional geographic and political boundaries. Individual or family ownership does
not sustain the burdens imposed by complex economic activity. An
independent elite with technical and commercial skills substitutes
its control of property. The institutionalization of the modern state
as a powerful regulative force in social organization, stressing economic
development as a means of societal development, also imposes limitations on the hitherto largely unqualified freedom of family ownership.
The impersonal corporate form of ownership, coupled with political
limitations on personal power and wealth, have served to modify the
role and importance of marriage. It is no longer a hardy agglutinating
7
agent for the implementation and perpetuation of property values.
The increasing pressure and competition for space, and for developed
and undeveloped economic resources, has resulted in a steady and
seemingly irreversible trend in the direction of minimizing an independent family role in property ownership. There has been a sharp
reduction in the top-seeded character of property ownership as a
family value. Consequently, property has increasingly become a
relatively insignificant and thoroughly compromised delineator of
marriage.
in relation to property has necessarily depended upon the needs and circumstances of the total process of social evolution. Letourneau reflected on
the differences in emphasis and experience with property in the course of
history, citing a course of development from communal to individual ownership. LETOURNEAU, op. cit. supra note 3.

Certainly Locke's identification of

property as virtually a sacred characteristic of and for the individual, may be
interpreted as a response and a contribution to the struggle of the individual
for political freedom in the age in which Locke lived. Cf. LARKIN, PROPERTY
IN T=E EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1930). St. Thomas, on the other hand, seeking
to inculcate a communal feeling and an unselfish spiritual attitude in the age
in which he lived, emphasized the social character of the private ownership of
property. McDoNALD, SOCIAL VALUE OF PROPERTY ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS
(1939).

6. The social and economic development, uses and rights of property are

emphasized in a rather recent work by McDOUGAL
WEALTH, LAND:

ALLOCATION,

PLANNING

AND

AND HABER, PROPERTY,
DEVELOPMENT (1948).

7. The burdensome role of large family ownership in modern economic
and social development has been analyzed by WEDGEWOOD, THE ECONOMICS OF
INHERITANCE (1929). Though his thesis is that family inheritances in 1929 were
still a burden to social and economic life in England, his evidence, with
reference to both England and other countries, suggests that the significance
of concentrated family ownership of economic resources has drastically
diminished.
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Marriage and Economic Activity
In earlier cultures and eras of recent Western civilization the
tools of production were comparatively primitive and economic
organization fairly simple. Agrarian enterprise was the primary
vehicle of production, supplemented later by the creative contributions of free artisans and craft guilds. Economic endeavour, for
those classes who endeavoured, was, from the point of view of production, feasible within very small units. Family hegemony in production
and some family proprietorship in tools and products developed. There
could be some interdependence and unity of economic enterprise
within the family. In fact, in many instances, the processes of production, distribution and consumption could be split and shared entirely
by and for the family itself. This was notably true in agriculture. The
male members assumed responsibility for the development of primary
resources and the production of much of the consumable goods. The
female members converted resources and goods to finished products.
Together with the males they organized and facilitated distribution
and consumption within the household. In fact, marriage, in providing
the form for procreation and the development of a family, contributed
significantly to the manpower resources that facilitated the continuity
and integration of economic activity within the unit. Economic activity
was organized generally under patriarchal authority. Members of the
family were interdependent for continued material existence.
The handling of the economic burden through family organization
provided a great social convenience in many respects. Economic activity in society was thereby distributed and regulated. Manpower resources were created, developed and exploited in an orderly and
simple manner. The processes of production and marketing were
rendered comparatively simple in operation. And the provisions for
and regulation of consumption had comparatively simple dimensions.
The family, altogether, was an important and convenient fulcrum for
the organization of economic enterprise.
The advent of industrialization, however, and the growth of the
factory and impersonal corporate enterprise, resulted in a drastic
revision of economic organization and management. 8 Economic activity
became largely separated from domestic enterprise and developed its
own, independent hierarchy of work distribution and manpower control. The family could not sustain the burden of creating the compli8. The development of economic practices and their relationship to the
social order over the course of Western history, is compactly presented by
CHAPIN, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

TO SOCIAL EcoNovry (1921)
and by
SINCLAIR, A PREFACE TO EcoNomIIc HISTORY (1934). Chapin, in a mellowed

fashion of reporting history, sees many economic events, at least until recently,
as repetitions of earlier patterns in civilization. A comparative analysis of
economic development and organization in primitive cultures is given by
HERSKOVITs, EcoNovIc ANTHROPOLOGY (2d ed. 1952).

1957]

MARRIAGE TRENDS AND DIVORCE POLICIES

517

cated and esoteric tools necessary in a new age of economic enterprise.
It did not have the resources to undertake the financial burdens of
production and distribution, and it was not equipped to provide and
train the manpower necessary in the diversification and professionalization of the newer practices and pursuits.
The individuation of economic function in the family logically resulted. 9 The interdependence of economic striving within a family
unit became more a matter of convenience and custom than a necessity.
While some family economic organization is necessary in order to
provide for minor children who lack the maturity and skills to sustain
themselves, adult interdependence within the family to serve this
purpose is no longer essential. The emancipation of women permitted
and provided for the largely unrestrained development of their capacities and skills on an equal footing with men. Manpower needs have
placed a premium on woman's skills, and she has become recognized
and accepted in her own right in the economic world. 0 She has been
able to establish a degree of economic strength and self-sufficiency
so that she is no longer quite so dependent, if at all, upon the material
resources of the family. She can and, in fact, sometimes does carry
the family economic burden on her own shoulders. Enfeebled individuals, too, are increasingly guaranteed the economic support of extrafamilial governmental agencies and private groups. They need rely
on the economic strengths and resources of the family much less than
in the past.
Societal investment in marriage and the family as an essential
economic resource and form of economic organization, has been largely
dissipated or displaced. Political and legal instrumentalities have
focused upon governmental and private commercial and professional
units as the core of economic development and organization. Economic
roles and functions are planned, implemented and adjusted with only
incidental reference to the family as a vital factor, and then largely in
terms of its passive role as consumer. The necessity to make marriage
work, or to make adjustments in marriage, with a view to its precious
9. This movement from a conventional order of economic relationships,
determined and cemented by the family group, to an order based on separation
and independence from family roles is the basis for Maine's famous dictum
that progressive societies move from "'status to contract." "Starting, as from
one terminus of history, from a condition of society in which all the relations of persons are summed up in the relations of Family, we seem to have
steadily moved toward a phase of social order in which all these relations
arise from the free agreement of individuals." MAnvE, ANCIENT LAW 172-73
(10th ed. 1906). Engels also stresses the phenomenon of individual economic
emancipation and the "free contract" in his discussion of the economic foundations of the family. See ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAVIILY-PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1902).
10. Cf. ENGELS, op. cit. supra note 9. Engels stressed that the predominant

AND THE STATE

characteristic of the patriarchal family is its insistence and reliance upon the
subjugation of women.
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economic function, is much less a pressing legal and societal matter
than formerly. There is slight sentiment but no significant trend to
suggest that the traditional organization of the family, and the family
in the economic role of earlier tradition, is likely to be reinfused with
significant economic life and meaning. In fact, with the increasing
scientific and technological displacement of mass manpower there is
a commensurate reduction in the work time and energy of the average
individual. The perplexities induced by long periods of leisure may
gradually shift the primary emphasis of marriage and the family even
further away from the struggles for economic survival.'2
Marriageand Procreation
Marital union for the purpose of procreation has become an
indelible stamp on the conscience of Western society. Further,
it is also an imprint of social practice and morality that marriage is the only proper form in which procreation can take place.
Deviation from the practice has been consistently punished by legal
and social sanctions. Periods of family upheaval and disorganization,
most notably in times of war, have resulted in substantial reproduction outside the marital form. However, there has been an unfailing
reversion and reinforced adherence to conventional practice upon
the subsiding of the large scale crises.
A threat to procreation, and hence to the purpose of marriage, has
been suggested in the implementation of birth control ideology and
birth control devices. Birth control has been conceived as the frustration of the supreme purpose of marriage and, in fact, as a denial of
the sacred character of marriage itself.' 3 Objections have not come
from moralists and theologians alone. Some social analysts have envisaged in the application of birth control, not so much a frustration
of marriage as a form of social development and organization, but the
danger of a failure to maintain and replenish population in many parts
of the Western world. 14
11. It has been particularly suggested that the evils and dangers of size.
and overcentralization today can be mitigated by breaking up and concentrating economic practices in families and smaller communities of people, as in the
past. COMFORT, AuTHORTY AND DEINQUENCY IN THE MODERN STATE (1950).
12. In fact, the problem of leisure has increasingly occupied the serious
attention of scholars and analysts who are concerned with the implications
of greater free time and even greater freedom for individuals. DODDS. THE
PROBLEM OF LEISURE IN AN INDUsTRmL AGE (1938). For a lighter treatment
of the subject, there is FURNAS, AMERIcA's TOMORROW, AN INFORvAL fEXCURSION INTO THE TWO-HOUR WORKING DAY (1938).
13. "Any use whatsoever of matrimony exercised in such a way that the
act is deliberately frustrated in its natural power to generate life is an offence
against the law of God and of nature, and those who indulge in such are
branded with the guilt of a great sin." Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Letter, Jan.
8, 1931.
14. Charles, for instance, writing in 1934, perceives birth control practices
as an important factor in stultifying population growth. He rejects NeoMalthusian theories which advance the proposition that birth control and
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Procreation through marriage, however, retains its resilient character. The increasing prevalence and use of birth control techniques
15
has produced no sustained negative effects on birth rate. It may have
birth rate.16
in
differences
contributed to exaggerated social class
Insofar as middle and upper social classes may have greater familiarity
with, greater access to and greater preference for the utilization of
birth control devices, the birth rate of these classes may, for a time,
have been detrimentally affected. But variations in birth rate appear
to be more a matter of general economic circumstances and changing
styles.17 Depression is associated with a lowered birth rate and high
style may, from time to time, be associated with a high birth rate.
Reproduction trends are much less a consequence of the frustration
of the procreative purpose of marriage through mechanical preventatives or the disruption due to social and psychological discord. The
instinctual character of procreation continues to assert itself in the
marital form, supported by moral suasion. It demonstrates its vitality,
notwithstanding the occasional ravages of invention and circumstance.
Marriage continues its significance as the social structure within which
procreation takes place. Increasing marriage and family disturbance
has shown no trend to so disrupt the physical boundaries of the family,
or discourage and prevent the consummation of new and subsequent
marital unions, as to create a crisis in the procreative function in
marriage.
Marriage and Individual Development
Property, economic and procreative functions as they have existed heretofore in marriage, have been served by the status of
marriage alone. The status, that is, the appearance that marriage
gives, creates the structure which facilitates an orderly pattern
of relationships mostly between the family and the external world,
planned parenthood are essential instruments in preventing overpopulation
and economic starvation. CHARLES, THE TWILIGHT OF PARENTHOOD (1934).
15. Birth rates in proportion to the total population have remained steadily
high since the economic depression of the 1930's, both during and since the
second World War. In fact, though the number of marriages has recently
shown a tendency to decrease, birth rate has maintained its high level.
Since illegitimate births have not significantly increased, it is evident that
there has been a steady average increase in the number of children per family
in the past few years. Cf.

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1955,

at 59-62.
16. A detailed evaluation of differential birth rates in relation to social

class, and the connection of this phenomenon with birth control, is presented in
GOODSELL, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY (rev. ed. 1936).

17. The influence of wars and depressions, particularly, on changing birth
rates and the size of population is analyzed by Hauser and Taeuber, The
Changing Population of the United States, 237 ANNALS (1945). The recent
change in style toward larger families for better educated and economically
prosperous individuals is reflected in the comment of Science News Letter,
Baby Boom Continues Among College Grads, June 19, 1954, p. 398. This
trend is in sharp contrast to that of some earlier periods for similar socioeconomic groups in the population. See note 16 supra.
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and within the external world itself. 18 The internal stability
and characterization of social and personal relationships within
the family has been relatively less important in the pursuit of
a formal pattern through which property, economic activity and
procreation could be safeguarded, developed or encouraged. The concept of marriage essentially as an organism with internal functions and
properties has been placed in focus by the events of recent history,
and has become a matter of public concern largely within the last
century.
The economic revolution created by technological development resulted in an anachronism in the family institution. The value and
purpose of family property diminished in importance, and economic
activity was diluted as the core of family life and centered away from
the family.19 There developed a need for the substitution of a different
rationale, a different kind of force and a different emphasis in function to help sustain the conventional forms of marriage and family
life. Having lost favor as an economic conduit the family could more
emphatically become a social conduit. But the economic revolution
also set in motion centrifugal forces that blighted the role of marriage
and the family as a social agent. A concomitant of the developing
technology of economic life was the development of communication
means and media, and transportation. The physical and mental mobility of individuals became more characteristic. The greater accessibility
of new worlds in thought and fact, and the intrusion of a belated
awareness of the possibilities, whetted minds and nerve. New freedoms and new opportunities defied older traditions and older stabilities. The family, or individuals within it, sought to improve their
economic status by uprooting themselves in response to a venturesome
economic spirit. Land ownership receded as a condition of economic
prosperity and activity. One or more individuals within the family
worked outside the home, or the home itself moved to a more propitious location in relation to the new source of income. Individuals, in
a world where darkness and distance receded, were emboldened to
new adventure, new knowledge and new status for themselves, and
this, too, resulted in the diffusion of family life. Political forms and
activities also manifested a new spirit. They responded to the conversion of economic life to individualized relationships, and were
18. Cf. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (10th ed. 1906); note 9 supra.

19. The deterioration of the family, as an economic and social unit, and
the influences that brought it about, are described in detail in a number
of sociological treatises. For example, TRTJXAL

IN AMERICAN CULTURE

FAMILY
DIVORCE

(1934),
(1931).

(1947);

GOODSELL,
PROBLEMS OF THE

A

AND

MERRILL,

THE FAMILY

ISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE

and
FAMILY (1936); LICHTENBERGER,
A different interpretation of the economic role of the

family in industrial society is presented by BOSANQUET, THE FAMILY (1906).
Writing fifty years ago, she advocated the family as a continued instrument
of economic cooperation in industrial life as well as in agriculture.

1957]

MARRIAGE TRENDS AND DIVORCE POLICIES

521

spurred on by secular ideologies now communicated with greater technical ease. There was a new respect and a new response for the individual and his welfare. His welfare, singly and collectively, increasingly
became the idiom of a new age. It was the individual who was being
reified, the individual as a member of a large society, often the individual as a member of an economic unit, or a political unit and, more
rarely, as a member of the family unit.
The centrifugal forces were running counter to the family, preventing its effective social functioning just as it had disrupted its economic
functioning. The emancipated woman, enjoying the flush of new roles
and new activities, increasingly became a part time member of the
family. She contracted out many of her family functions to other
individuals, 20 hurriedly accomplished them with the technical assistance of automation, or let them pass by default. Except for procreation, which could be largely a mechanical matter and was perhaps a
response to instinct, her personal resources and energies were increasingly consumed outside the home. They were absorbed in the
fulfillment of her many and diverse capacities, or in status-producing
and pleasure-contriving activities in which the family played no part.
The development and specialization of learning activities, newly
available on an egalitarian basis, contributed and may have been a
response to the abnegation of the family's historical educative role in
child rearing. The presence of children was more frequently considered
a happenstance. Socially accepted substitutes for family activity and
plausible rationalizations for the avoidance of family responsibility
became common-place. The impetus for the development of substitutive family processes became greater. Responsibility for the function
of character development and education of the child has now largely
been thrust upon educational institutions. 21 It is placed there at an increasingly youthful period in the child's life.2 The health of the child
has also become more of a public concern and responsibility. Its importance and need for attention has been dramatized by the advances
in the biological and mental sciences, particularly within the last
century.2
20. The boon of baby-sitting today, verging on an extreme, may be the
bane of psychological and social stability in family life. It is one manifestation of a large-scale trend toward substitution for many kinds of domestic
activities.
21. The stress on character education and social experience has been a
dominant theme and the major trend in American education at younger
levels in this century. The influence of the educational philosophy of John
Dewey has been pervasive on public school educational practices. Cf. Bums,
A CULTURAL HISTORY OF EDUCATION (1st ed. 1947).
22. The growth and spread of the modern nursery school in urban and sub-urban areas today, is only a logical development of the principles and purposes
of kindergarten education espoused by Froebel and influenced by Pestalozzi
in nineteenth century Europe. Cf. BUTTs, op. cit. supra note 21 at 435-38.
23. Analytical concentration on the health and development of the child,
is one more manifestation of the dominant educational and scientific interest

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 10

Increasing secularization and formalization of the child's education
outside the home has also compromised the family's function in the
mQral and religious development of children. Churches and religious
agencies have paralleled the expansion of secular education into the
earlier life of the child. However, the infiltration of antipathetic practices and thought-ways have undermined the ties of church and family
altogether. Predominant among these have been the ideas of evolution,
the increasing urgency of material motives and satisfactions, and the
greater mobility and lesser physical stability of the family. The
strength and influence of the church has been undermined, and the
reliance of the family upon the church dissipated. Traditional moral
precepts have increasingly become a symbol system further removed
from the pragmatic experiences of life.
Even the diversions and leisure time activities of the family and
its members have become mobile and disengaged from the crumbling
wheel of family life. Leisure time resources have become specialized
and commercialized, marketed ready-made for the members of the
family, generally outside of the home.
The gradual evolution and transfer of the child development functions of the family to specialized and professionalized agences may yet
succumb to an odd twist of experience. Ironically, the knowledge and
experiences which these agencies have cataloged may bulwark the
great significance of family life in the stabilization and adjustment of
individuals. A more acute comprehension of the process of juvenile
delinquency lays this difficult problem at the door of the family in a
variety of theoretical guises. 24 Family disorganization is increasingly
recognized as a prime etiological factor in emotional instability and
mental illness.2 A lack of taste or talent for family life, evidenced in
family disharmony and the breakup of marriages, is also most significantly related to the failures of early family background.2 6 The family
in personal welfare in this century. In this respect G. Stanley Hall's patient
labors in the study of child development have great bearing and influence.
HALL, ADOLESCENCE (1905) and other publications.
24. The contributions of the Gluecks, and the analyses of Aichhorn and
others with psychoanalytic background, stress the importance of the role
of the family in the development of anti-social behavior. GLUECK & GLUECK,
UNRAVELLING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1950); SEARCHLIGHTS Ox DELINQUENCY
(Eissler ed. 1949).
25. A number of sociological and psychiatric treatises emphasize the various unpleasant and unhealthy psychological consequences of a lack of family
organization and integrated family life. E. MOWRER, FAMILY DISORGANIZATION
(rev. ed. 1929); GRoVEs, THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1934); H. MOWRER, PERSONALITY ADJUSTMENT AND DOMESTIC DISCORD (1935); ISAACS, TROUBLES OF
CHILDREN AND PARENTS

(1948);

GREENACRE, TRAUMA, GROWTH AND PERSONALITY

(1942). Koos has provided a very intimate portrayal of the effects of family
conflicts and difficulties on family members. Koos, FAMILIES IN TROUBLE
(1946).
26. The relationship between spouses' estimates of their own marital happiness and their estimates of the happiness of the parents' marriage is shown

to be significant.

TERMAN,

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN MARITAL HAPPINESS
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disorganization of one generation spawns the criminal behavior and
social and personal disorganization that are the acute social and
legal problems of a succeeding time. An adequate substitute has not
yet been found for the critical formative influences of integrated
family life on early personality development.
In consequence, society has developed forces which attempt to mitigate and resolve the breach in family social and psychological integration. Mental health and its development have increasingly become a
matter of common consciousness, as a result of the constant stream of
discovery and communication from the specialties of health and education. School and child development agencies, and the private resources of medical and educational specialists, are increasingly available. These provide substitutes for family experience, but this is less
important than their assistance to the family in negotiating certain
critical aspects of its responsibility for the development of children.
Such counsel, though sometimes blundering and uncertain, has forged
the beginnings of a new and more subtle concept of family responsibility in the upbringing of children. It finds its basis in psychosocial
relationships. Problems of criminality, particularly those involving
juvenile delinquency, are seen less as the machinations of the devil
and more as a subject matter of the family and its influences. Legal
policy and procedures are now geared to the treatment of the juvenile
27
problem as a matter viable in the context of domestic relations.
The consciousness of family and family responsibility has been attended recently by an increase in the size of many families. There
has been an upswing in procreation by those individuals and social
classes who are in a more able social and economic position to raise
children.2 A related development is the resurgence of interest in
family homes with a subsoil of their own, where family life can be
nurtured somewhat better than it has been in the concrete molds
within the urban center.29 It may be that, after the first flush of free202-07 (1938). Some trends in the direction of this relationship, but with
less conclusive results, have been demonstrated by HAMILTON & MAcGOWAN,
WHAT IS WRONG WrrH MARRIAGE 180 (1929). and BURGESS & COTTRELL, PREDICTING SUCCESS OR FAILURE IN MARRIAGE 98-102 (1939). Chronic parental

disagreement and disharmony may have most invidious effects upon the personal stability of offspring and may blight their later relationships. The connection of parental disharmony with a child's mental illness is being demonstrated by Lidz in yet unpublished studies at Yale University. Bergler has
written extensively on unhappy marriage as a function of personal instability.
BERGLER, UNHAPPY MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

and DIVORCE WON'T HELP (1948).

(1946),

CONPLICT IN MARRIAGE

(1949),

27. The modern social and legal orientation in dealing with juvenile delinquency is described in PREVENTING CRIVIE (Glueck ed. 1936).
28. See notes 15 and 17 supra.
29. The exurbanites have outdistanced the suburbanites in their removal
from the city, and have accentuated the modem quest for the quiet graces
of country living. SPECTORSKY, EXURBANITES (1955). This shift in style may,
by intent or indirection, produce some effect in the reintegration of some
aspects of family life.
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dom, the emancipated woman will find a more suitable integration
and compromise between her destiny and responsibility as the bearer
and protector of family life, and her need for the fulfillment of her
other capacities.
In sum, there is strong evidence pointing to the substitution and
even the disintegration of the social role of the family. The family,
and hence marriage, has been failing as an agency for individual development. There are, however, some strong countervailing forces
that seek to impede and even to reverse this trend.
Marriage, Love and Companionship
The emphasis on the direct societal functions of marriage over
a period of centuries thoroughly submerged the phenomenological
character of marriage and its role as an adjustment process between two individuals. The frustration or limitation of this purpose in marriage achieved vicarious expression in the imaginatively reported peccadilloes of various notables in history and
literature. It can also be recognized in the prevalence of the institution
of the paramour and the mistress, wherever the indulgence could be
afforded and was factually, if not morally, tolerated. But it was the
growth in personal freedoms, and the spur of communication and
mobility, that trumpeted simultaneously the cause and the failures of
marriage as a personal relationship. Freudian psychology, borne on
a wave of resentment toward Victorian repression and anchored in
the inevitable biology of human beings, brought to a crescendo the
call for the fulfillment of the individual. Individual self-awareness,
self-expression and self-indulgence became a matter of high fashion in
paroxysms of reaction against frustration and self-containment. Sexual
activity increasingly became a pervasive symbol for personal freedom
and self-mastery. A fuller sexual expression became more candidly
both a biological urge and a psychological necessity. 30 This first
thunderous release and overreaction of the individual, breaking ,the
chains of personal suppression, has not been without its backwash.
The marriage institution, already weakened by the withdrawal and
decompensation of many of its traditional functions, was buffeted
even more severely in this full blast of unbridled individuality. The
wreckage of families multiplied and the strains of interpersonal conflict became stronger. 31
30. Cf. KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE
BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953).

(1948),

and

SEXUAL

31. That divorce has become a rather common social phenomenon and
divorce rates are comparatively high is a matter of general knowledge. The
rate in the last five years has been approximately two and one half divorces
for every thousand existing marriages per year. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1955, p. 59. Cahen presents a somewhat older but detailed
analysis of the statistics of divorce. CAHEN, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF AMER-

ICAN

DIVORCE (1932).
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But this uprooting of the individual from his traditional social climes
produced its struggles and its contradictions for the human personality.
The psychology so comprehensively conceived and richly detailed by
Freud has within it the seeds of social salvation. The adjustment of
people to one another and the psychological potentials for social organization have become important incidents in more penetrating
studies of interpersonal relationships and social structure.3 2 Studies
of the interpersonal process in marriage represent a comparatively new
focus in the analysis of the marital institution.33 Marriages are analyzed and treated in terms of their ability to reflect compatibility
between the partners and to produce a sustaining state of happiness
for each spouse. Definitions of compatibility and of marital happiness
have been ephemeral and have been essentially a matter for selfdetermination by the spouses.34 These definitions may or may not
encompass procreation, or social status, or economic convenience, or
platonic friendship, or sex. There may be multi-determinants or single
determinants on which the foundation of the marriage and the anticipation of its success is based. There may be an agreement to conceive
the marriage in terms of particular propositions and purposes, and to
acknowledge the freedom of the individual in other respects. On the
other hand, marriage may be used essentially to solemnize and publicize a bond of mutual affection, or an experiment in affection, and
give it a concrete social form. It may be devoid of any tangible plan or
purpose for the future.
As the nuances of interpersonal relationships, notably the marital
relationship, are unfolded, it is evident that concepts and problems of
marital adjustment operate on a treacherous base. Marriage is a process of intimate interpersonal relationship extended and complicated
by many experiences over a course of time. Its prospects for a full life
term must be measured in terms of the consistency and stability of
personality organization and the motivational structure of both
spouses. It must be measured in terms of the moderation of life ex32. This trend is documented by the growing social orientation of psychiatry. Of particular interest are the contributions of SULLIVAN, THE INTERPERSONAL THEORY OF PSYCHIATRY (1953); FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM
(1941); FROMM, THE SANE SOCIETY (1955): KARDINER, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
FRONTIERS OF SOCIETY (1945); LASSWELL & KAPLAN, POWER AND PERSONALITY
(1952).
33. A recent theoretical formulation of family relationships in terms of

the process of personal and social interaction has been effected by PARSONS
(1955). A very
elaborate connection between social role and personality need factors is
propounded as a basis for personality action and relation, patterned upon
some of the earlier work of Parsons.
34. The "subjective feeling of happiness" criterion of marriage success provided the basic reference point for acquiring and analyzing data in most
recent studies of marriage. Cf. TERMAN, PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN MARITAL

AND BALES, FAMILY: SOCIALIZATION AND INTERACTION PROCESS

HAPPINESS

IN MARRIAGE

(1938); BURGESS

(1939).

AND

COTTRELL, PREDICTING SUCCESS

OR FAILURE
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periences so that the personalities and the marriage may more surely
accommodate themselves to change. Personalities must have the capacity for resiliency so as to attune themselves to the changes and stresses
that operate almost imperviously and without simultaneous and commensurate effects on both parties. The perception of each spouse by
the other that represents the ostensible basis for the marriage, must
be reasonably sustaining or accurate. And it must be attended by a
formidable conviction to make the marriage serve its purpose.
The success of marriage as a process of interpersonal adjustment is
a matter of trial, not certainty. General predictions are hazardous and
the evidences of failure are strong. It may be that adjustment conceived in terms of life-spans is an unreasonable demand on the awakened curiosity, insatiability and movement of many, if not most,
human personalities. However, Western society has not seriously
considered an alternative social form for heterosexual love and companionship.35 It is dedicated, at least in its ideals, to the stabilization of
the marital form. Most importantly, the need for a base of community
behavior between spouses is essential to the proper fulfillment of
parental roles and the role of marriage in child development. And,
procreation as a civilized process is also in need of adequate social
communication between the procreators.
Highly mobile concepts and practices in love and companionship
along a broadening segment of society have introduced some radical
applications of the concept of marriage. 36 Whether the institution of
marriage is sufficiently viable to cope with a reformulation of its
traditional frames of reference, or whether it is the practices and
value systems of the population that are to be remolded, may be only
the foreshadowing of a contest, if companionate marriage is to survive
at all. The function of marriage in love and companionship has had
an unfavorable course, but counteraction stemming from a deep sense
of social necessity has bestirred itself. Given marriage in its traditional form with its traditional contemplations, the mental and social
sciences are set the task. They must balance the keen individual expression which they have helped to unleash, with that accommodation
to social adjustment of which the human personality is made capable,
and which is so necessary for a healthy and satisfying personal and
social life. A certain result is not yet clear.
35. In this respect, contrast the many modes of establishing social and
sexual relationships and the structure of family life in other cultures and
civilizations. WESTERMARCK, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN MARRIAGE (5th ed. 1921)
and HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS (1902). The organiza-

tion and regulation of sexual relationships in different cultures has been particularly analyzed by FORD

AND BEACH, PATTERNS OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR (1951),
and SEWARD, SEX AND THE SocIAL ORDER (1946).

36. Lichtenberger details some of the incidents and characteristics of an
individualistic orientation toward marriage today that have resulted in a
changing concept of the institution. LICHTENBERGER, DIVORCE 334-50 (1931).
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The Role of Marriage in Western Society Today
Marriage in Western society today is, as it always was, transitional. It
is a mechanism interacting with other social mechanisms in the course
of social change. It is both a cause and a consequence of this change.
Property is still a characteristic of marriage, but it is no longer a dominant characteristic or a dominant concern in the large run of marriages.
Social class discriminations that perseverate property trusteeship as
the great distinction of marriage continue to exist, but governmental
policies and popular sentiments suggest an advanced state of mordancy in this distinction.3 7 The family is no longer the social order's
favored economic unit. In fact, from the point of view of historical
comparison, it is hardly an economic unit at all. Breadwinning for
self-support and the support of minors is an indefatigable condition of
family life, but this is today mostly an individual and not a family
responsibility. The economic function of marriage in a world of
advanced technology and economic plenty, is today a peripheral consideration in marriage and divorce policy. So long as economic resources remain in good supply, this condition in the economic purpose
of marriage is likely to prevail. Procreation and marriage reflect an
indomitable mutual faith and sense of companionship. The relationship is permanently unrestrained by various catalysts of social change
and upheaval. It seems a well-ingrained attachment that requires no
extra social or legal advice today.
The role of marriage in love, companionship and in the social
development of its younger family constituents, is more problematic.
Trial and tribulation seem to be today's order. Older policies are
more tenuous, newer policies quite tentative, as law and the social
order come face to face with the more fully developed proclivities
and the potentialities of the human personality. The setting of an
enduring policy must first witness the outcome in the conflict between
opposing capacities and wills in the individual. And this has not yet
come to pass in a tangibly full and complete expression.
Given the meanings of marriage today, law's search for a realistic
policy for marriage and divorce is narrowed and focused. It is a search
for the policy to fit the surviving and changing concepts and uses of
marriage. It must be in a key that is responsive to and consistent with
the trends that develop in human experience. Marriage today, if it
is anything, is a biological, social and psychological proposition. It
has largely ceased to be an economic proposition, and a matter of
wealth and property. The biological proposition nurtures and governs
itself from the strengths it has acquired in time. The problem is:
what should be the role and policy of law in the face of the ongoing
metamorphosis of the social and psychological character of marriage?

37. See note 7 supra.
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DIVORCE POLICIES

The Early Development of Modern Divorce Policies and Laws
The theoretical framework of modern divorce traces its evolution
through two major streams of social experience. It is a demonstration
and expression of historically-founded, deep-seated moral convictions,
and it is an outgrowth of an intense struggle for political control.
The dissolute behavior of the Romans in the days of Christ engendered a depressive spirit from which a moral reaction was born.
The reaction took expression in the form of a new morality. The
virtues of the family were rededicated, in an age when the structure
of family life was tottering and disintegrating. The great virtues of
brotherhood and love were proclaimed and, in sanctified marriage and
family, would find their greatest fulfillment. These new teachings
were the teachings of Jesus Christ. Those relating to marriage were
borne in the synoptic gospels of Mark, Matthew and Luke. 38 They
endowed marriage with permanence. "What therefore God hath
joined together, let not man put asunder,"39 though Matthew granted
an exception for adultery. "[W]hosoever shall put away his wife,
except for fornication ... committeth adultery. '40 The teachings were
given literal meaning, and were the basis for an attempt to formulate
a Christian law of marriage from the verbatim texts of the New
Testament. Gradually, an effort developed to substitute this Christian
legislation for the civil law of marriage which the new church inherited from the Roman Empire. The civil law of Rome at that time
41
espoused free divorce.
The later Christian fathers perpetuated and intensified the dominant
conviction of the insolubility of marriage. The utterances of the
disciple Paul strongly influenced a critical attitude toward any divorce,
though they were not entirely unambiguous. 42 The later fathers
38. MARK 10:11, 12; MATT. 5:31, 32; 19:3-9; LUKE 16:18.

39. MATT. 19:4-6.
40. MATT. 19:9.

41. A brief account of the later Roman laws and practices of divorce, and

a detailed account of the development of Christian doctrines and practices
in marriage and divorce will be found in 2 HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 14-85 (1904), (hereinafter cited as HOWARD), WORSLEYBODEN, MISCHIEFS OF THE MARRIAGE LAW 38-119 (1932)
(hereinafter cited as
WORSLEY-BODEN), and WOOLSEY, DIVORCE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION 34-193 (2d
ed. 1882) (hereinafter cited as WOOLSEY). Howard gives the most matter-offact account, writing from the point of view of an historian and political and

legal analyst. Worsley-Boden is clothed in the role of an advocate for the
reform of English divorce law. He minutely analyzes and suggests fallacies
in the literal interpretation of the scriptures for the purpose of church legislation. He also opposes the nearly exclusive influence of the church in matters of divorce. Woolsey takes the view of a Christian moralist who is concerned about the departures of secular divorce law from the traditional
proaches that have been influenced and guided by the scriptures and the

church.

42. 1 COR. 7:8-16. Paul appears to counsel against divorce, expressly for-

bidding the wife to "depart from her husband," but then adds, "if she depart, let her remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband." By this
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congealed the attitude of the church. Augustine made indelible the
theory of insolubility. Adultery was admitted as the only scriptural
ground of separation, but even this did not destroy the marriage com43
pletely.
Converts to Christianity and Christian doctrine became increasingly
legion. In time, a number of Roman emperors embraced and promoted Christianity. Among these was the great emperor, Justinian.
He sought to apply ecclesiastical principles to the Roman laws of
marriage and divorce, giving divine principles the added influence
of temporal law.4 4 He modified divorce by consent, permitting such
divorce only if one of the parties was impotent and therefore unable
to fulfill a divine purpose of marriage, procreation. He also permitted
divorce where one of the parties joined a monastery, allowing the
remaining party to remarry. And, sensitive to the real burdens of
life and experience at the time, he allowed a divorce where one of
the spouses was captured by an enemy. A political realist, Justinian
later added treasonable behavior as a ground for divorce. Following
in the path of the literal translation of Christian moral precepts, he
permitted divorce where there was an inducement to commit adultery,
where the wife was falsely accused of adultery, and where the husband
consorted with another woman.
The radical restriction on Roman divorce did not permeate, however, and was partially rescinded. But, as the tides of Rome ebbed
out, Christianity became stronger and more dominant. It became
more firmly institutionalized as a religion and commanded gradually
heightened power over secular affairs. Canon law grew into a great
system of legislation which opposed, embraced and finally superseded
civil law. The canon laws governing matrimony were particularly
comprehensive, tacitly recognizing the supreme role of marriage and
the family as a conduit for religious teachings and as a key instrumentality for moral development.
As the Christian church became supreme in the western world in
both religious and secular activities, its focus shifted to an amplification and a consolidation of its completest power. At the Council
of Trullo, in the year 692, laws governing affinity, and hence the
eligibility of parties for marriage, were elaborated. The celibacy of
priests was required, and marriage after divorce was proscribed.
Finally, nearing the apex of its strength and glory, a great consummalatter counsel he apparently approved of separation, but within the bonds of
marriage.

43. AusTNE, DE CONJUGirs ADULTERInS. Augustine's contributions to the
final shaping of the Christian laws of divorce are discussed in WOOLSEY 110-12
and HOWARD 26-27.
44. In particular, JUSTINIAN, NOVELLAE 117, 134. Worsley-Boden analyzes
in detail the codifications and legislation of Justinian in relation to marriage
and divorce. WORSLEY-BODEN 70-74.
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tion was achieved by Gratian, who integrated and codified the Canon
law.45 As finally settled, the Canon law decreed that there could be

no divorce a vinculo, no permanent and final divorce. Divorce a mensa
et thoro, permanent separation but without the dissolution of the
marital form, was permitted for reasons of adultery, cruelty and
heresy or apostasy. And, in culmination, it was decreed that all matters governing marriage were to be ministered by the church. Secular
marriage and divorce laws were synonymous with the laws of the
church and were exclusively administered by the church. What began
as the alleged legislation of the literal terms of the Gospels became,
after an intense political struggle, the invariant law and doctrine for
nearly all of Western civilization. It became widespread, and took
hold through legions of Christian conquerors and Jesuit priests and
monks throughout Europe. Eventually, it reached England with the
invasion of William the Norman. 46
The power of the church was cemented in the doctrines of the
church. The idealization of a life hereafter, -and the equation of life
on earth as a moral test for benediction in eternity, were gauntlets
for qualification in true Christianity. Imposed in stentorian tones,
and enforced with untempered cruelty and viciousness, the Christian
ideals were blotched, if not perverted, by a wave of fear and suppression. Conformity and repression were dictates for the human personality, drowning the miseries and inequities of life in a strangular
vise. There was no opposition. There was no enlightenment, and
no realistic consideration of the morality, the justice or the compatibility of the laws of family life.
But, in Lord Acton's classical aphorism, "all power corrupts, and
absolute power corrupts absolutely."47 In time there became evident
a divergence in the doctrines and the practices of the church. Taking
a sanguine interest in the insulation of power through wealth, the
church permitted special dispensations in regard to marriage lawsfor a handsome fee. While divorce in name did not exist and could
mot be secured, annulments of marriages became increasingly attractive and increasingly available for those who could afford them. They
became, in fact, a key instrument of monarchial policy for the princes
and kings, 48 reaching to a dramatic climax in the remarkable marriage
careers of Henry VIII.49 The matter of annulment eventually con45. GRATrIAN, DEcRETUm. The work and influence of Gratian in solidifying
the Christian laws of divorce is analyzed in WORSLEY-BODEN 79-87, and

HowARD 53-56.
46. WORSEY-BODEN 94. The development and application of canon law
in England is described in 1 POLLOcK AND
(2d ed. 1903).
47. AcTON,HiSTORY OF FREDOM (1877).

MAILAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISi LAw

48. See 2 HowARD 57.
49. The matrimonial career of King Henry VIII is presented in detail and
its political meaning is briefly analyzed in WORSLEY-BODEN 102-11.
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tributed to his break with the church of Rome, when he was ultimately refused one for one of his marriages. Annulments were granted
for a variety of convenient reasons that existed in fact or in fraud,
inevitably wrapped in a cloak of piety. Complementing the special
dispensations for annulment, there also developed, in like circumstances, special dispensations to remove impediments to marriage,
such as affinity or consanguinity. Facts were adjusted to cope with
the dilemma produced by doctrine, and pragmatic results were
achieved which, in effect if not in theory, changed the marriage laws
for some individuals.
While church practices in the administration of marriage were
adjusting to the psychological and political realities of life, at least
for .the upper classes, church doctrines remained static and impassive.
As the breach in theory and practice broadened, the power of the
church gradually dissipated. Its waning influence and authority was
first manifested most dramatically in the disillusionment and departure of some of its most able scholars. A wave of reason and enlightenment became a flood of reaction to the impiety and repression
in the conduct of church affairs. The Reformation brought the new
spiritual leadership of Luther and Calvin and Erasmus. 50 The Protestant movements split off from the Catholic Church of Rome.
The break was a spiritual disillusionment, seeking not a repudiation
of religion but an intensification of it through an enlightened respect
for and adherence to the doctrines of the Bible. Luther acknowledged
marriage, not as a sacrament but as a worldly event guided by the
great moral precepts of the Bible. By his translation of scriptural
authority, absolute divorce, divorce a vinculo, could be granted on
grounds of adultery and malicious desertion, the latter ground incorporating the refusal of sexual intercourse by one spouse with the
other.51 Other offenses were accepted as grounds for a temporary
separation, generally in anticipation of possible reconciliation. These
included anger or incompatibility, attempts by one spouse upon the
life of the other, exile and incurable disease. The practice of granting
dispensations to circumvent the new doctrines was discontinued.
A literal interpretation of the scriptures persisted, equating immorality with sexual misbehavior. However, the more excruciating
circumstances and misfortunes of life were given some cognizance.
They were a basis for the temporary doctrinal disestablishment of a
marriage that had in fact been interrupted. But there was another
group among the Reformationists, guided by the teachings of Erasmus.
50. The views of the early Protestant reformers are summarized in
Tetrachordon,3 PROSE WoRxs 423-33 (1697).
51. WORKS

OF MARTIN

MILTON,

LUTHER (Spaeth ed. 1915-32). The views of Luther

are also briefly given in WOOLSEY 128-32 and summarized from secondary

sources in 2 HOWARD 62-64.
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This group opposed the literal interpretation of the scriptures. They
asserted the doctrine that the scriptures, in admitting adultery as a
ground for divorce, intended that divorce be permitted for this and
52
all equally grave offenses.
The modification of the doctrines relating to marriage and divorce
was part of a thorough-going rejection of many phases of the Canon
law, including its dominance and control of civil power and secular
affairs. Civil law was gradually reestablished in western Europe. Under Luther's influence, jurisdiction and authority in matters of
marriage were reinvested in the state. Divorce procedure reverted
to the later Roman practice. It provided for dissolution of marriage
without ministerial authority. Judicial cognition became a matter of
concern only where the prior fact of a divorce had to be established
in order to consider permission for a remarriage. In time, however,
judicial procedures for divorce became a formal requirement. Consistorial courts were set up under civil power. The practice of these
courts in the granting of divorces had a still further liberalizing
influence, notwithstanding religious dogmas.
But the geographic insulation and political arrangements of England
caused a different course of events in matters of marriage and
divorce.53 The independent Church of England replaced the church
of Rome as the supreme spiritual power. Church and state were not
separated, as in many parts of western Europe, but united. The
Church of England was the church of the state, and the jurisdiction
of marital affairs remained a spiritual matter. At first Parliament
followed the patterns of the Roman church in permitting divorce for
special reasons. It allowed divorce to those rich enough to engage
it and convincing enough to impel its authority. Ultimately, however,
marriage and divorce were delivered to the domain of the ecclesiastical
court, a court of the church. Canon law survived, absolute divorce
was not allowed and judicial separation was permitted only for
adultery, cruelty and heresy. Separation procedures were administered in the tradition of Canon law, with proofs of moral fault and
shameful and disgraceful behavior required in a setting of uncompromising mutual antagonism and vindictiveness. From its earliest traditions, the affair involved the authority of the church and
the honoring of its doctrines. The assignment of guilt was a matter
of upholding moral rectitude and punishing the delinquent. It required dramatizing the trial and its outcome in order to effect an
impression on the consciences of all Christian followers.
52. R cHTER, Beitrage zur Gesch. des Ehescheidungsrechts in der evang.
Kirche 6, cited in 2 HOWARD 64.
53. The evolution of the laws of divorce in England from the time of the
Reformation to the passage of the Matrimonial Causes Act in 1817 is described
in WORSLEY-BODEN 101-19.
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At the time that it occurred, the transfer of authority in marriage
affairs from the church of Rome to the Church of England occasioned
some fears that the excesses of the Dark Ages would persist. There
was some church sentiment, buttressed by the views of reformers,
that the laws regarding divorce ought to be relaxed. Parliament requested and considered a report of a commission suggesting reform
in the divorce law. This report, the Reformatio Legum (1552),5 advocated absolute divorce for a number of causes reflecting sexual misbehavior, for desertion or cruelty, for the implacable and irreconcilable hatred of one spouse toward the other, and for prolonged disappearance accompanied by an assumption of death. Jurisdiction
was to be transferred from Parliament, where it then existed and
where dispensations could be offered as in the Roman church, to the
Ecclesiastical Court.
The recommendations were not accepted into the letter of the law,
but they were reflected to some degree in practice. Remarriage was
permitted even though preceded only by separation rather than absolute divorce. Ultimately, as a reaction to this kind of laxity in
divorce matters, the spirit and the letter of Canon law was reinstituted and remained until the nineteenth century. Despite the
eloquence of John Milton,5 5 who inveighed against a conception of
marriage as moral when it fosters moral impropriety, and a conception of morality based on carnal behavior, the English law of divorce
was unchanged until 1857. At that time, absolute divorce was permitted for one cause, adultery, and jurisdiction was transferred to
56
a civil court.
54. The history of the

of a treatise, DIBDIN

REFORMATIO LEGuM and its provisions is the subject

AND CHADWYCK-HEALEY, ENGLISH CHURCH LAW AND

DI-

and subsequent developments in the application of the divorce laws is discussed in 2
HOWARD 77-85.
VORCE

(1912). The immediate impact of the

REFORmATiO LEGum

55. MILToN, Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, 3 PROSE WORKS 169-273
(1931). Tetrachordon, id. at 274-314, Colasterion, id. at 434-61, The Judg-

7nent of Martin Bucer, id. at 274-314. Milton, himself a divorc6, provided the
inspiration and, indeed, the thought and language for the modern exponents
of free divorce. "... the absolute and final hindering of divorce cannot belong
to any civil or earthy power against the will and consent of both parties ...
Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, Bk. II, c. 21. "[T]o interpose a jurisdictive
power over the inward and irremediable disposition of man, to command
love and sympathy, to forbid dislike against the guiltless instinct of nature,
is not within the province of any law to reach; and were indeed an uncommodious rudeness, not a just power." Ibid. "So that which way soever we
look, the law can to no rational purpose forbid divorce; it can only take
care that the conditions of divorce be not injurious." Ibid.
56. The English divorce laws of today are, in their basic orientation and
substance, unchanged. Before 1937, adultery was substantially the only
ground for absolute divorce. In 1937, through the influence of Sir Alan
Herbert, three additional grounds were added: wilful desertion, cruelty and
incurable insanity. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1936-37, 1 EDW. 8 & 1 GEo. 6, c. 57,

§ 2. The recent report of the Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial
Causes (1956) failed to recommend any important changes. The commission,
composed of six women and thirteen men from the legal, medical, sociological
and teaching professions, equivocated on policy and refused to take a strong
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Problems of marriage, in legal terms, persisted as problems of
morality exclusively. Fidelity expressed primarily in carnal terms
was the chief virtue in this morality. The economic, psychological
and social delineators of marriage hardly ever systematically intruded
in legal considerations. To the extent that they were recognized
at all, they probably represented unarticulated premises on which
the substance of decisions concerning marriage may in part have been
based.
The Development of Divorce Policies and Laws in Colonial America
and in the United States
The traditions of old world thought and morality were the
partly indispensable and inevitable accompaniments of the migration to America. A similarity of experience bred a similarity of
logic and the comfort of custom recreated established modes of
life. The traditional molds of the motherland were interrupted
and modified only where dispute had intervened. The spirit of
Puritanism was the creation of such a dispute. It led to the rejection of the rigid and intolerant canonical observances and rules
in the Church of England. The permissive Protestantism built on
the revolt of the Reformation was substituted. In colonial New England the spirit of the Reformatio Legum, rejected in Britain in the
sixteenth century, was put into partial practice by the Puritans and
the Separatists. 57 Canonical decrees of separation, divorce a mensa et
thoro, were practically though not entirely abandoned. A permanent
dissolution of marriage was freely granted for various moral and
factual ruptures, such as desertion, cruelty and adultery. The role
of Canon law and the ecclesiastical court was further attenuated
by the transfer of marital affairs to civil jurisdiction. Administration
was imprecise at first because of the lack of any legislation to provide consistency in marriage and divorce laws and practices. The
civil authority which assumed jurisdiction was generally the governor,
or another executive official, and the town council. Matters were
heard informally and dealt with summarily. Generally, the rigors
of the frontier and the spartan character of life absorbed the attention and energy of the settlers. Standards of religious practice remained vigorous and social life continued largely in the ascetic
traditions of the Catholic Church and the Church of England. Family
disorganization and divorce did not protrude themselves on any
significant scale so as to force any elaborate and detailed consideration
of the problem.
stand. A brief description of the conclusions in the Royal Commission report
and its place in the British laws of divorce is contained in N.Y. Times,
March 25, 1956, § 4.
57. 2 HOWARD at 330-66, using comprehensive reference materials, analyzes
in intimate detail the grounds, cases and practices of divorce in Colonial New
England.
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In the Crown colonies of the middle and southern regions of the
country, the colonists more directly inherited the laws of England
that became the initial common law in the states.58 True to canonical
traditions only separation, not absolute divorce, was permitted, and
then only for adultery and cruelty. But these colonies neither had
nor were authorized any ecclesiastical court to implement any form
of divorce. As a practical proposition, therefore, there was no legal
divorce. There developed in consequence, as a matter of necessity and
conscience, the unusual practice of granting the wife alimony without
a divorce. This practice of the equity courts thus circuitously took
cognizance of a factual disruption of a marital relationship, with its
attendant social and economic complications.
Pennsylvania did in fact permit absolute divorce for the cause of
adultery, but could not regularly administer this law for lack of a
proper ecclesiastical court.5 9 New York, under English domination,
also held matters of divorce in abeyance for lack of a designated ministerial vehicle to execute any legal policies. The paternalistic influences of earlier Dutch settlement entirely disappeared. These
granted to magistrates the prerogative of arbitration in marital conflict and, in fact, required such a procedure and a delay before grant60
ing any divorce.
After the Revolution, the state governments were thrust on their
own responsibility. For the most part, they approached the legislative
task in marriage and divorce belatedly. However, there ensued what
Lord Bryce has termed "the largest and the strangest, and perhaps
the saddest body of legislative experiments in the sphere of family law
which free self-governing communities have ever tried."6' Divorce,
from a legal point of view, became entirely a civil matter.62 But it
drew its policy substance from an inherited concept of morality, and
confined itself to this narrow frame of reference in its experimentation with laws and consideration of policy change. No larger frame
of reference readily and articulately presented itself. Intense social,
economic and psychological exploitation that irrevocably and radically
changed the patterns and structure of social life, had yet to develop.
In the main, a strong trend toward absolute divorce occurred throughout the country. But the expansion and diversification of life in this
frontier country created a somewhat more libertarian or, at the
very least, a more tolerant frame of mind as to the incidents of traditional morality. Divorce on the classical ground of carnal impro58. Id. at 366-87.
59. Id. at 385-86.
60. Id. at 376-85.

61. BRYCE, STUDIES iN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 830 (1901).

Concomitant

developments in ecclesiastical divorce legislation in the United States are
described in LIdHTENBERGER, DivoRCE 210-46 (1909).
62. A detailed account of the development of divorce legislation, state by

state, is given in 3

HOWARD,

A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS (1904).
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prieties was of course granted. It was given for adultery, physical
cruelty and desertion. In addition, it was permitted for reasons of
drunkenness, conviction of a crime, attempts upon the life of either
spouse by the other, gross neglect, etc. In a few instances, an omnibus
provision was inserted to provide grounds for divorce. For example,
divorce was allowed, among other reasons, for "gross misbehavior
and wickedness in either of the parties, repugnant to and in violation
of the marriage covenant." 63 Omnibus provisions were most generally
rescinded because of their lack of specificity and their unworkabiity.
In summary, there developed a massive tinkering with and shifting of
grounds for divorce. This process essentially reflected a recognition
of the factual break-up of marriages for reasons having strong undertones of moral reprehensibility.
In many jurisdictions the divorce laws were first administered by
the legislature. As this proved increasingly unwieldy, these jurisdictions joined the others in placing responsibility for the administration of marriage and divorce laws in various courts of law or
equity. The procedure for divorce was unfailingly construed as
adversary in nature. Civil law inherited the church's struggle of
the moral against the immoral, the all pure against the all wicked.
There could be no conciliation, no sympathetic understanding or indulgence, no charity and tolerance in resolving the moral problem.
The law, which clearly has a vested interest in morality in its own
right, was defining the issue in the traditional terms of the medieval
church. The cloak of public authority and responsibility was broad
enough to encompass only that structure and definition of the problem
that the church expressed for its own political purposes and for its
espousal of a narrowly defined morality.
The Laws of Divorce and the Realities of Marriage Today
The legal requirements for divorce today have been fashioned from
the practices of a long tradition heavily influenced by ecclesiastical concepts of morality and psychology.# Moral culpability, expressed in dimensions of a single act or one person's acts of a particular sort, provides the stern conceptual criterion for divorce. A public contest to
establish relatively unshaded properties of good and bad is the practical basis for legal decision in the matter. Divorce ig almost universally granted in the United States for adultery and for manifest
63. R. I. Pub. Laws 1798, at 479.
64. "No other branch of ethics has been so largely determined by dogmatic

theology as has the ethics of marriage and the family." 2 LECKY, HISTORY

OF

371-72 (1869).
"Both Protestants and Catholics have, in general, viewed divorce not from

EUROPEAN MORALS

the point of view of the biological purpose of the family, but from the point
of view of the theological conception of sin." RUSSELL, MARRIAGE AND MORALS
224 (1929).
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acts of cruelty or desertion by one of the parties to a marriage. 65
Alcoholic indulgence, criminal behavior resulting in conviction or
incarceration, and the failure to provide material support are also
generally common causes for divorce. A variety of other morally
reprehensible acts by either spouse have been sanctioned as a basis
for marriage dissolution. Among these are drug addiction, fugitivity,
venereal disease contagion and public defamation of the marital
partner.
The urgency of social reality, mirrored by the dominant ethic of
freedom and personal fulfillment, has forced some compromise in the
moral foundation of divorce law. The bald fact that a marriage no
longer maintains any physical or spiritual existence has provoked
another set of legal causes for marriage dissolution. The importance
of this later trend has been documented by the frequency with which
insanity and the factual implementation of separate existences have
become grounds for divorce. This conceptual root in the physical nonexistence of a marriage also serves to broaden the rationale on which
desertion, cruelty and non-support can be established. It may help
to influence some decisions in favor of granting a divorce on these
grounds.
A third set of legal causes reflects the legislative confusion between
annulment and divorce. The voiding of marriage for reasons that
existed at the time of its consummation has been confused with dissolving a marriage for reasons that were an outgrowth of the marriage and occurred after the nuptial agreement was concluded. The
rationale for these annulments, legislatively termed divorces, is again
to be found in the narrow construction of morality and in the denial
of marital purpose as established in the early doctrines of the Christian church. Impotence at the time of marriage, and the wife's pregnancy by another at the time of her marriage, are common statutory.
causes for divorce today. Antenuptial unchastity, concealing a "loathesome" disease that existed at marriage and chronological immaturity,
are other more occasional statutory bases for divorce whose factual
circumstances already existed at the time of marriage.
The stipulation of conditions for a legal dissolution of marriage
evidences the state's concern with marriage as an instrument of its
policies. As a conserver of morality and of social stability, perhaps
also as an instrument for the martialling of property and other economic resources, it has conceived the preservation of marriage as a
cornerstone in its policy. Divorce in these circumstances must be
sparingly granted and only under circumstances of great abomina65. For a concise chart indicating the long-standing grounds of divorce in
all American jurisdictions, and the more recent statutory additions in each
jurisdiction through 1951, see HARPER, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 658-59
(1952).
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tion.66 Not only must there be substantial cause based on notions
of fault-the existence of a fact or a set of facts to justify divorcebut there must be substantial proof.6 7 Matters of proof are, in the
great traditions of law, matters for a court. The instrument of proof
is the adversary technique, that is, the juxtapositioning of facts and
arguments that are opposed to one another, sharpening distinctions
so as to facilitate judicial decisions. The display of proof, and decisions
as to culpability in divorce, have become the property of a variety
of civil courts in America. Some of these are courts of general civil
jurisdiction, and a few have been specially created to handle domestic
relations problems. 68 The procedure in the tradition of all contests
of fact and law, is one of formal disputation. Relative circumstances
become matters of indelicate precision and form the basis for the
broadest consequences to the freedom of individuals, their rights to
property and wealth, and their privileges and responsibilities for
children. The whole drama unfolds as a modified medieval inquisition in which uncomplicated villainous characters are given uncompromising retribution to the assured social benefit of all. The
process is charged to impose spiritual condemnation, material deprivation and social frustration on the morally delict. It draws on
all the strengtihs and formidability of the old ecclesiastical courts,
modified only slightly by relatively benign civil law practices.
It is not the rigors of practice but its deception, not so much the
problem of practicality as the issue of the conceptual base that
casts heavy doubts on divorce laws and procedures today. The intensive character of psychological and sociological findings, though
still very far from an embodiment of knowledge about the human
personality, provides some stable insights into marital disruption.
Viewed from the perspectives of behavior study, any individual
behavioral manifestation is a symptom of or an expression of a
complex of events. Any meaningful conception of the behavior will
not be found in the event itself, or in metaphysical adumbrations upon
it, but in an understanding of a larger segment or interlocking seg66. One state has added and maintained a significant exception to causes
for divorce based on the fault theory or, at least, the theory of the fault
of one person. New Mexico law provides, as ground for divorce, incompatability of temper. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1 (1953).
67. A more enlightened legal perspective today is reflected in the recommendations approved by the American Bar Association for the elimination
of the fault theory and the adversary approach in divorce. 73 REPORTS OF TIM
Am. BAR Ass'N (1948).
68. A complete summary of the courts who have jurisdiction in divorce
cases is presented in 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 98-104 (1932),
Supp. 50 (1938). Vernier, in 1931, tabulated approximately fifty variously
designated civil courts which handle petitions for divorce. Three jurisdictions assigned divorce petitions to courts of domestic relations or family
courts. In two jurisdictions, divorce went before a probate court. In four
counties in Texas, divorce was a matter for the criminal district court. BALDWIN, COMPLETE STATUTES 1925, COURTS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, art. 52.
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ments of an individual's life. Alcoholism, for example, may be an
expression of a life full of frustrations and misfortunes which, for
the purposes of characterization, may be termed a defect or disorder
of development. It may, on the other hand, be more particularly an
expression of marital discord fertilized in the defective and incompatible behaviors of either or both spouses. Or it may be a characteristic of the dominant business and social environments in which the
individual lives to drink heavily, and this brings the propensity or
trait more focally into the marital relationship. Extramarital sexual
activity may reflect the pressures of the biological and psychological
development of the individual. It may be a reaction to marital frustration caused in part by the misbehavior or inadequate behavior of the
other spouse or both spouses in the home. It may be a manifestation
of substantial or dominant patterns of marital behavior in the larger
culture at any given time.
In the traditions of a narrow construction of moral responsibility,
it may be relatively easy to equate long-standing defective character
and development with immorality, and identify a given behavior such
as crime as a product of that immorality. The difficulty arises in the
denomination of moral responsibility where the delinquent behavior
of one individual can in large part be ascribed to the deliberate or
unintended subversion of another individual. This is today less a
matter of speculative occurrence, in the light of our greater familiarity
with and closer observance of human behavior. Certainly it is a
disease of the conceptual process to consider, as the law does and as
the church has always done, that the responsibility for the immorality of a given behavior should be ascribed entirely to the person
who overtly expressed it and not at all to the person who covertly
induced it. The trends in time reveal many sustained changes in attitudes and behavior, reflecting shifts in the associations of morality
with thoughts and actions. Today's microscopic examinations of
behavior can encourage more refined formulations about the relationships between law, morality and conduct. 69
In any event, the formulation of the problem of divorce in terms
of the moral issue alone conceals the complicated and multi-dimensional character of the marital relationship. It provides, by itself, an unrealistic basis for the designation and operation of divorce
laws. From both a conceptual and a practical standpoint, marriage
is today predominantly a psychological and a social interaction. The
69. Cf. FLUGEL, MAN, MORALS AND SOCIETY (1945). Evolutionary and rational concepts of morality, at least, can comprehend a broader base for
moral judgments in a better understanding of the conditions of behavior and
the sources of ethics in the human personality. The controversy of free
will vs. determinism may still be largely inevitable but it need not be so
intense and fundamental. The points of view may not have to be diametric
opposites.
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chart of marriage is the day-to-day experiences of the spouses. It
is not primarily consecrated in a sense of everlasting duty, of obligation to fulfill certain social responsibilities for family or property or
economic well-being. It is an intended fulfillment of personal needs
and preferences. Marriage based on psychological principles is not
new, but psychological principles cast in isolation from a binding sense
of social obligation presents many difficult problems. The pressures
of tradition have been uprooted, in part by the modified and more
inconsequential economic character of marriage and the family.
Marriage has become more in the nature of an experiment in selfsatisfaction.
Given an experimental frame of mind, the assumption of risk is
made easier, and the fear of consequences is not sustained. Conventional social forms and social meanings weigh less heavily, or are
modified. Marriage is a matter of present feeling and not importantly
a matter for planning or implication into the future. It can, it is
thought, be easily sustained by an emotional charge, or a limited purpose, or no purpose at all but simple adventure. The difficulty in
this hedonistic view is in the deficiency of the conceptual premise.
Marriage may well begin as an illusion, as an experience of one dimension, but it cannot remain so, even by choice. The relationship
of one person to another is complicated by a variety of needs. It
is also complicated by a variety of roles that force the inner doors
of the marital relationship and insist upon recognition. The marital
couple are caught up in a complicated series of relationships that
even the best prepared do not fully anticipate. With the first recognition of the vastness of the relationship, of its complexities, the trial
for the life of the marriage begins.
The struggle for stability and success is complicated by inconstancies
and change. Personality needs and dispositions may change in the
process of experience, sometimes within the experience of marriage
itself. Old needs may be satiated, or intensified with each succeeding
frustration; new needs may be created. The pressures and diversities
of social living may bring into the marriage new and strange feelings
and experiences. It may bring a host of outside contacts and activities,
some of which may not be congenial to the intimacy and satisfaction
of the marital relationship. Time intrudes to change outlooks and
motives, and these may not correspond, quickly or completely enough,
for the spouses. Marriage becomes an intensely human process built
upon uncertain events.
Given the awakened self-awareness that the individual has been intensively experiencing in recent history, these problems have become the real and critical issues for marriage. They present the
central frame of reference through which marriage conventionally
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gains its meaning today. As a general rule, fortunately, the resilience and adaptive facility of the human personality permit it to
overcome change and surprise. Individuals are elastic enough to
accept discomfort and frustration, and not infrequently turn it to
their ultimate advantage or satisfaction. But this is not always the
case, certainly not the case often enough, so far as the institution
of marriage is concerned. Unrealistic initial appraisals of the spouse
are usually conditioned by a lack of mutual familiarity in a range
of experiences. This inevitably results in some disillusionment with
the marriage. Too skimpy a base in knowledge about the marital partner may make changes and adjustments in the marital process exceedingly difficult.70 An inner lack of capacity or will for broad tolerances, or an unreasonable and perhaps unavoidable external pressure,
can strain the bonds of marriage, the more so when it is weakly conceived in the first place.
Human experience and ingenuity is a fertile source for solutions to
new and difficult problems. However, where experience has suffered
from unpleasant distortions and maturity has not been reached, the
solutions do not reflect wisdom.71 When antagonisms occur the logic
of responses is reduced by the intensity of the negative emotion. The
resultant is often a matter that forces itself into the view of policy
makers, legal administrators and other protectors of the interests
of society. Unsuccessful marriage is more than a simple misfortune.
It is a pattern of misfortunes traced through a series of related persons
and events. Failure of the marriage, that is, failure in the sufficient
anticipation of its complexities and in the solution of its problems,
gnaws at the personal stability of the marital partners. It spawns
the conditions for aberrational behavior or intensifies the grounds
on which manifest disturbance may occur. To forestall disaster, an
element of added personal control and suppression may be introduced
into the marriage. Behavior may generally become more guarded
and stilted, with volatile emotions erupting only from time to time.
But an even weaker solution may occur and raise issues of immorality
as well as unhappiness. The home may be forsaken in favor of dissipative or anti-social expressions and outlets. Mental illness is also
a not unlikely consequence where the stresses of marriage unduly tax
the resources of the personalities. Desertion, separation and divorce
70. The significance of the relationship of pre-marital acquaintance to
the happiness of marriage, as defined by the spouses, is documented in the
research investigation of BURGESS AND
FAILURE IN THE MARRIAGE 164-71 (1939).

COTTRELL,

PREDICTING

SUCCESS

OR

71. Marriage itself may be the product of immature attitudes and neurotic
needs, and an anticipated solution for personal problems. Such a foundation
in the marital relationship will sooner or later foster conflict and dissatisfaction with the union. This psychological point of view is elaborated by
BERGLER, UNHAPPY MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (1946), and CONFLICT IN MARRIAGE

(1949).
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may provide the last and sharpest thorn in the heavy wreath of disillusionment.
But the burden of divorce policy is not such a simple matter as
freeing two miserable incompatibles from one another, charging
them to seek a safer course, a safer experiment next time. This is so
even if the problem is conceived as one of compatibility and distinguished from the problem of inorality. Divorce may not always be
the answer. 72 It may be thrust out as a plea for help and not always
as a demand for dissolution. And even though there is agreement
that a couple divorce in their own best interests, there still remains
the problem of the best interests of the children. The impact upon
them of divorce and divorce arrangements or, alternatively, continued marriage, must be carefully considered. The children of an
unhappy marriage have the most to lose and are the least protected
from the consequences of incompatibility.73 It is they who carry the
scars of strife and unhappiness. Manipulated but unsupported, given
solicitude but unloved, rejected or ignored by either or both parents,
they carry on the family fight on their own terms. These are the terms
that reflect themselves in juvenile delinquency statistics, and in
serious social and psychological aberration. 74 They are the seeds that
will create in fullest force the policy problems of the next generation.
And they must course through the problems of divorce law today.
Each new edition of strife in an unhappy marriage sends out new
waves of disillusionment. They go out into work, into play, into the
various social, economic and political roles of the marriage parties.
They are the carriers of the diseases of an unhappy marriage. If
parties are given the strength of forebearance the problem may not
be so serious from a societal point of view. But, given a few strategically located individuals falling victims to the pressures of dissatisfied marriage, the consequences may be felt by yet other in5
dividuals on an even broader plane of life.7

72. Divorce may be analyzed as a symptom or a step in the internal struggles of an individual to cope with his problems. Cf. BERGLER, DivoncE WON'T
HELP (1948).
73. A careful analysis of the problems of children whose parents have
divorced is given with poignant effect by DESPERT, CmLDREN or Divo c.
(1953).
74. Psychiatric, psychological and sociological literature is today rich with
materials demonstrating the relationship between family disorganization and
the anti-social behavior and psychological problems of children. The disorganization is reflected in the attitudes and behavior of the parents, and in
the maladministration of their own and the family's affairs. The response,
the disturbed reactions of the children, becomes identified as a clinic or
court problem. The process is forcefully presented and stated in many
articles and treatises. GLUECK & GLUECK, UNRAVELLING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
(1950); SEARCHLIGHTS ON DELINQUENCY (Eissler ed. 1949); IsAAcs, TROUBLES
OF CHILDREN AND PARENTS (1948); GREENACRE, TEAumVA, GRoWTH AND PERSONALITY (1952).
75. E.g., the impact of personality factors in politics, grounded in drives,
frustrations and satisfactions, was analyzed by LAssWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
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To all of these complicated matters of profound social importance,
the law today unfortunately provides but simple and stock answers.
It holds: show who was at fault, a fault severe enough to incur moral
disapprobation, and a divorce will be granted, or prove that the marriage-though not the family-is irrevocably dead and a divorce can
follow. Judicial wisdom can temper the effects of an understated or
overzealous law. 76 Conciliation may formally be encouraged." Judgments may be sensitive and humane, within the limits of judicial
knowledge. The law itself may allow separation and support.7 8
It may proclaim a waiting period before it will recognize any finality
to precipitate action.79 It may insure the physical upkeep of spouses
and children after a final divorce.08
But the thrust of law, both on paper and in action, largely misses
the essence of marriage and bypasses the problems of divorce. Though
POLITICS (1930),
MODERN STATE (1950).
AND

and

COMFORT,

AUTHoRiTY

AND

DELINQUENCY

IN THE

76. It is not uncommon for courts to construe desertion and cruelty so
as to contemplate a wide range of behaviors. The broader definitions reflect
the imagination and sensitivity of the courts, if not their fidelity to literal
meanings. The conception of "constructive desertion," for example, contemplates that the spouse, who by his abuse or intolerable behavior has
forced the other to leave the home, has committed desertion. Noteworthy as
decisions based on this rationale are Godfrey v. Godfrey, 284 Ill. App. 297,

1 N.E.2d 777 (1936); Kruse v. Kruse, 179 Md. 657, 22 A.2d 475 (1941).

The concept of cruelty has been judicially enlarged so as to encompass
petitions based essentially on intemperance and incompatibility. Harman v.
Harman, 198 Cal. 695, 247 Pac. 194 (1926), demonstrates an instance of
intemperance judicially masqueraded as cruelty. Griesen v. Griesen, 146 Fla.
94, 200 So. 523 (1941), is a case where incompatibility has been glibly turned

into cruelty in order to enable the court to grant a divorce.
77. In 1939, California passed a statute providing for compulsory conciliation

efforts where a petition for divorce also involved minor children. However,
the compulsion to conciliate existed only if either spouse chose this course, and
thereby bound the other. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1730-72 (Deering 1953).

A Children's Court of Conciliation was established for such a purpose, but it
has apparently been active only in Los Angeles. Interest is developing in a
few other jurisdictions to authorize conciliation efforts by statute or court
rules, though there has been some suggestion that the procedure should be
utilized only with the consent of both parties. These trends are reported by
GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEw YORK Crry 358-59,
361-74 (1954). Informal persuasive efforts to conciliate are also available as
a matter of court discretion. To give substance to the informal conciliation
procedure, Judge Paul Alexander of the Toledo (Lucas County) Ohio
Domestic Relations Court employs a staff of trained marriage counselors.
78. Divorce a mensa et thoro is still available in the majority of jurisdictions, according to the count of 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws 342 (1932).,
Separation agreements are generally favored by statutes or court decisions.
Id. at 467. These devices may be quite humane, and perhaps salutary as

well, where absolute divorce is unavailable or undesired. Alimony for the
wife and support for the wife and children, dating back to the days of the
ecclesiastical courts, are commonplace statutory requirements. They are, in
principle, the outstanding, if not the only, manifestations of humanity and
compassion in the traditions of the laws of divorce.
79. A number, though less than a majority, of jurisdictions require that
a temporary decree, termed an interlocutory decree or a decree nisi, first be
issued. A final and absolute divorce will then be granted only after the
lapse of a period of time, variously set by statutes between one month and
one year. 2 VERNIER, op. cit. supranote 78, at 150-56.
80. See note 78 supra.
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the original vindictive spirit of laws of divorce can be blunted and may
be ignored, the literal requirements and plain words of statutes cannot be so easily cast aside. The authority and prestige of the law
require that they be observed and followed. Nevertheless, the plain
facts of experience indicate that they have been subverted time and
again.8 ' Matters of proof to establish grounds for a divorce have become matters for illegal conspiracy. Rather than conform to a
law that does not serve self-defined interests, many people have preferred to circumvent it. They have cbmmitted whatever improprieties the law requires in order to serve its conditions for a divorce. 82
The law has legislated against such behavior to safeguard its prestige
and its honor, but it has not prevented it. The multiplicity of laws
governing conditions for divorce are seldom quite right. They offer
unrestricted freedom where a focus on responsibility may be important. Or else, they demand rigid restrictions in freedom where
responsibility and social order would better be served by a more
tolerant and understanding outlook. Underlying these unfortunate
extremes is a conceptual schema that sees the problem of divorce as
a matter of complete right and vindication, or complete wrong and
stigmatization.
Where the laws are more flexible, judicial tempering and discretion
offer the possibility of enlightened decision about divorce, and enlightened divorce administration. Unfortunately here, too, there is a
lack of a sufficiently fine sense of the problems involved, augmented
by the tendency to resort to precedent and to ancient conceptions.
There has resulted a standardization of judicial responses that falls
81. "There is very great difficulty in framing laws as regards divorce,
because whatever the laws may be, judges and juries will be governed by their
passions, while husbands and wives will do whatever may be necessary to
circumvent the intentions of the legislators." RusSELL, MARRIAGE AND MORALS
233 (1929).
82. The law has been ravaged time and again and, in contratemps to
thought on ravishment, entirely to its own shame and disgrace. One or
both spouses, desperately seeking to establish the grounds for divorce, have
conspired to produce the necessary evidence. The law has countered with
"collusion" and "connivance" as bars to divorce. Statutes, cases and treatises
are replete with demonstrations of the conscientiousness with which the
law has undertaken to regulate and restrict the emotions. But collusion and
connivance must be proved, and the conspirators were least willing to give the
evidence necessary to deprive themselves of the benefits of the law, even at
the risk of prosecution for perjury. To provide assistance in the vain enterprise to safeguard the dignity and prestige of the law, the office of the King's
proctor was established in 1860 by legislation. The task of the proctor was
to see that the legal conditions necessary for a court decree were valid and
free of illegal contrivance or suppression of evidence. The institution of the
proctor was adopted in some jurisdictions in this country. But in most jurisdictions in the United States the proctor has essentially a nominal function.
He represents the paternalistic interest of the state, or other parties vitally
interested in the outcome of a divorce proceeding who are not represented.
In effect, his role in divorce litigation is generally insubstantial today. Vernier
presents data relating to the prevalence and use of the proctor system in the
United States. 2 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 78, at 92-98.
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either far short of or far beyond the needs of the situation. Problems
of alimony and custody are seen in oversimplified dimensions and
tend to be resolved in a mechanical manner. The usual safeguard is
provided in the technique of having adversary counsel assert each
client's interests to the fullest, so that the court may have a more
complete consideration of the issues. But it fails in this instance.
Even where representation is not lacking-that is, even where the
proceedings are not ex parte83-lawyers generally lack the background
and training to comprehend and hence to present the many essential
facets of the divorce problem. They are frequently not so much the
representatives of the interests of the clients as the prime movers
in a mechanical assembly plant, grinding out artificial and frequently
less than beneficial results. Their role and functions today are not
consonant with personal or social needs.
The Search For An Enlightened Marriage And Divorce Policy
It is fairly evident that, in principle, present legal policy must support the institution of marriage. It provides necessary structure for the
organization of personal relationships. It is the commonly accepted
mode for purposes of procreation, and it is most essential for the preservation of the health and welfare of children. However, the physical
fact of marriage cannot by itself sustain organization instead of disorganization in personal relationships. And it cannot create conditions
of health and by itself avoid a diseased environment for children. The
physical circumstance of marriage is an undependable criterion on
which to base a prediction of emotional health and social stability.
Legal policy, to be socially effective, must do more than certify a marriage practically at the simple request of the parties, or proclaim
a state of divorce when one party produced evidence of another party's
moral guilt. A co-ordinated program of prevention in matters of
marriage and correction in matters of divorce must be undertaken.
Prevention in connection with marriage is the attempted prognostication of compatibility in the marriage relationship. It must be
made along a course of subsequent events and preferably for a long
span of years. Predictions of such a kind are admittedly largely beyond the scope of present resources of knowledge. They involve a
83. Estimates and studies suggest that over ninety percent of divorce
actions are uncontested. Parties in fact negotiate for divorce as a matter of
mutual consent or personal indifference. In these circumstances, the whole
structure of divorce law, including its moralistic underpinnings, collapses.
The spectacle of retribution does not take place; the controversy from which
facts will develop and abound, does not exist. Real contests are infrequent
and are more likely to be a consequence of disagreement, not over divorce,
but over property settlements and the custody of children. Not only is there
a lack of contest but, in many instances, in fact, there is collusion and connivance. 1 MARSHALL AND MAY, THE DIVORcE COURT (Maryland) (1932); 2 id.
(Ohio) (1933). GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 77, at 282-90, also discusses the
problem in New York and its implications.
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long-term program of research into patterns of experience in marriage,
patterns of conflict and resolution, and accommodation and defeat for
different combinations of personalities. Such research must contemplate the influences of the personal aging process, and changes in
the views and conditions of social life over a span of one or more
generations. The task is formidable. But present funds of psychological
and sociological knowledge can be useful in assisting prospective couples to evaluate their present attitudes with regard to their marriage.
It can help them in their own estimates of their prospects for success.
Such self-disciplining in relation to the undertaking of marriage may
not assure the success of the marriage in all or many of its future trials.
It may, however, create a degree of awareness sufficient to test the
initial will and tolerances of the parties in relation to their impending
union. To this end, a compulsory period of waiting subsequent to
the parties' notice of intent to marry and prior to their entering upon
the formalities of marriage, would be essential.8 The interval needs
to be of sufficient length so as to permit a course of instruction and
counseling during which an opportunity for reflection may be given.
The difficulty of imposing counseling as a condition to be met preceding marriage, is that the legal institution does not have its own
resources or its own staff or school to provide such services. Further,
few other institutions are now presently equipped to offer such services on a regular and substantial basis. 85 The requirement can, however, be suggested as a voluntary commitment by the couple.
The stipulation of a lapse in time, standing by itself, compromises
the potential effectiveness and value of the waiting period. But
time alone, and certainly time exposed to counseling, will prevent
84. Banns, or public proclamations of an intention to marry, have long
been customary and, at times mandatory, in the history of Western marriage.

(2d ed. 1952).
They served the purpose of preventing clandestine or illegal marriages. Today
2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 370

in the United States it is common to require that an application for marriage
license be made and a waiting period of one or more days ensue before the
license is issued. In some jurisdictions the waiting period is instead required
after the marriage license is issued and before marriage takes place. In
four states, the publication of banns serves in the place of a marriage license.
1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 54-58 (1931), Supp. 10-11 (1938).
85. Pre-marital counseling, however, is becoming an increasingly prevalent phenomenon on the American scene. Many colleges have courses on
preparation for marriage, usually given by sociologists or home economists.

Reputable manuals offering information and advice about problems relating
to pre-marital and marital relationships are commonplace. Cf. STONE AND
STONE, A MARRIAGE MANUAL (1939); HINES, YOUR MARRIAGE: A GUIDE TO
HAPPINESS (1940). Marriage and family counseling have become an integral
professional activity. The American Association of Marriage Counselors

bands together psychiatrists, sociologists, lawyers, psychologists and others
who specialize in counseling services for marriage and family problems. Special agencies and clinics provide education and extensive services in connection with marriage and family adjustment. The Marriage Council of
Philadelphia, under the direction of Dr. Emily Mudd, is a prime example of
an organization offering to marriage and family the services of physicians,
social workers, psychiatrists and others. Cf.
COUNSELING (1945).
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the use and subversion of the marital form when the project of
marriage is based on nothing more than a spontaneous set of impulses or a fleeting desire.
Pre-marital examination for evidence of disease or illness is another
obvious form for the husbanding of marital success and the control of
social health and heredity. 86 The common practice of examination for
syphilitic disease is, in the light of medical advances in cure and
prophylaxis, no more crucial than for other kinds of illness and disease.
The detection of any disease process may be quite valuable in preventing a later strain and surprise in the marriage. The prevention of
marriage on account of disease must be attuned to the advances of
medicine. Where medical science has found a means of arresting
disease and reversing the process, the eugenic, physical and psychological dangers in marriage may not be large enough to justify the
deprivation of the freedom of marriage.. Where, however, science has
not made such advances, the safeguarding of social interests, the
avoidance of highly probable social difficulties and the preservation of
the biological species, may advise a formal proscription of marriage.
Examination may also serve an intermediate purpose. Temporary
incapacity may reduce or for a time destroy a party's ability to
estimate the risks and responsibilities of marriage. A psychotic or
severe neurotic illness may be such an instance. A delay in the
completion of marriage formalities pending a return to better health
becomes necessary to effective social policy.
Measures of prevention in relation to marriage, particularly when
maximized, pose the threat of a serious incursion upon personal and
traditional freedoms. The uncertainties of knowledge may so limit
predictive efficiency as to render a restriction of personal freedoms
unwarrantable and unconscionable. This is particularly so in the
light of current individualistic ethics. The predictive tests of marriage today have serious liabilities, with the possible exception of
those dealing with the most obvious requirements of physical and psychological qualifications. Marriage qualifications by public mandate
are largely a possibility for the future. It is to that time that a consideration of the relative values of freedom and control should be postponed. Legal policy today can best be set in the direction of enhancing
knowledge of and for marriage. It can provide social services to the
marriage institution by encouraging and exploiting the use of present
resources for the better understanding of the marital relationship.
The correction of the illnesses of existing marriages cannot take
such a tolerant view toward time. The preservation of personal and
86. In some states examination is required to establish qualifications for
marriage under existing laws. The examinations, usually perfunctory, assess
particularly evidence of venereal disease and, in addition, evidence of tuberculosis, feeble-mindedness or insanity. VE.RNIE, op. cit. supra note 84, at 128-39,
Supp. 19-20.
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social stability requires a penetrating solution when the issue of
divorce is presented. Clearly, in some instances the resources of
the marriage are strong enough to support and perhaps sustain a
process of reconciliation. This may be the most beneficial personal
and social solution. It may frequently more nearly represent the
preferences of the parties when the venom and vituperation that are
a product of conflict are exhausted or dislodged. In other instances,
where resources to sustain the marriage are weak or antagonistic,
the continuation of the marriage only serves to intensify personal conflict and spawn greater personal and social disorder. Divorce may
offer the better prospect for stability and morality in the future,
where once these have been breached. The rationale of divorce is
rehabilitative rather than retributive.
The choice of solutions to marital conflict may be a somewhat
different matter for legal policy than it is for the parties. To the
parties, solutions to marriage problems, particularly where they involve the disruption or destruction of the relationship, are a matter
of strained emotion. Truths may be concealed and faults exaggerated.
But in the policy and procedures of law, decisions about marital conflict can be somewhat more detached and more rational. The problem
becomes one of prediction from information about the previous
course of the marriage and sources of conflict. It is a matter of
knowledge about the personal strengths and weaknesses and the attitudes, that parties bring to bear on the relationships. And it is a
matter of balancing the assessments of risks and resources in relation to the imminent future trials and foreseeable events in the marriage. The information and prediction, to be useful and reliable, must
reach the subtleties of understanding that usually come only with
special training. And this training is both intensive and comprehensive in nature.
The challenge of such a legal policy is one that cannot realistically
be met by legal administration today. Such adjunctive resources as
clinics and consultants can supplement the limited and sometimes
antagonistic resources that legal training provides. But these are not
available on a uniform and large enough scale. They are not certain
enough and not broad enough in their orientation to provide the best
solution for coping with the pressures of both private and public need.
The consequence, for the moment, is generally a rather heavy dependence upon the preferences and the judgments of the parties themselves. Their experiences become the measure of decision.
Until there evolves a more certain determination of the social
adaptability of the emancipated human personality, and of its willingness to adapt to conditions of social organization and control, freedom
to choose divorce where only two persons are immediately involved is
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not unrealistic. It entails some sacrifice of social order. This, however, is mitigated by the reasonably strong and still well-ingrained
traditions for the maintenance of the marital form. It is, further, a
calculation that freedom in these matters, pending clarification as to
the dispositions of man and the development of a thorough and successful program of marriage control, is preferable to restriction based
on irrelevant criteria. The latter may coincidentally arrive at the
most useful and satisfactory solution in some situations. But it has
equal chance to complicate and intensify other situations of marital
87
difficulty and create more extreme and disruptive social problems.
The policy dilemma is unmitigated where divorce is a matter of
sought-after freedom for one party and unpleasant coercion for the
other.88 Similarly, unilateral or categorical solutions may not be
sufficiently sensitive where the health and welfare of children are
concerned.8 They may not avoid with sufficient frequency the acute
strife and the serious social misfortune that can befall error. The
situation requires analysis of the experiences of the marriage, the
potentialities of the parties and the incipient problems of the relationship as a precondition to any decision concerning divorce. It requires some probing forays into the possibilities for developing a
change of attitude and better skills in adaptation. Such estimates represent a prognostication of the likely behavioral adjustments of the
spouses and children. They are based on the implications of the
present orientation and personality make-up of these individuals for
responses to future conditions, to changes, intensifications or deprivation of relationship.
The responsibility for analysis is beyond the competence of an
unaided court. It is a challenge to the skills of mental hygienists.
It is a demand that they produce the fullest knowledge and the best
predictions of which they are presently capable. Statutory prescription and judicial procedure should, as a matter of necessity and preference, invoke the services of clinics and encourage their development
87. Freedom in these matters, on the other hand, destroys the appearances

and perhaps some of the substance of social stability. Cf. Lichtenberger's
twofold composition on marriage as a static institution and a dynamic human
relationship. LICHTENBERGER, DIVORCE 12 (1931). But it may free individuals
from a disagreeable situation that disposes them to greater frfstration and
more frequent manifestations of personar and social disturbance. Iri a few
instances, freedom may, of course, have the contrary effect of letting loose an
unstable individual who is only likely to involve himself repetitiously in the
kind of predicament from which he was released. Complete personal liberty
as a basis for establishing the rights and benefits of divorce is by no means
the ultimate solution. It is, under present circumstances, probably the preferable policy for couples without children who are agreed upon divorce. It
is certainly a policy that is more consonant with the individualistic ethic of
the present age.
88. A petition for divorce may be in many instances only an intermediate
strategy in the marital struggle, calculated for iti present effect and not its
ultimate result. See note 72 and related text.
89. Consider again notes 73, 74 and related text.
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in the service of the court.90 This is quite necessary to produce the
kinds of evaluations essential for sound decision. A mandatory requirement for such evaluations is probably not beyond the scope of
presently and imminently available facilities,9' if its use is limited
to contested petitions for divorce and divorce petitions where the
welfare of children is a concern.
An unvarnished examination cannot hide the effects of stagnation
in the legal study and handling of marriage over a period of many
centuries. At a precipitous moment in the history of the family,
dramatized by the circumstances of modern living, the skills and
knowledge with which to cope with the problems of marriage are
precariously short of the mark of necessity. Responsibility is clearly
. not uniquely in the legal domain. Law and legal policy have traditionally been a slow response to the evolution of patterns of behavior in society. In this transitional period for marriage and the
family, legal policy and procedure can perhaps recline and await
clearer developments and more tangible results. It can on the other
hand, develop its resources for coping with probable developments as
reflected in the trends of marriage and family life today. Courts
handling domestic relations problems can evolve into family centers
or agencies.9 2 Here legal, psychological and sociological skills and
90. There has been a noticeable trend, particularly in larger municipalities,

for courts responsible for the administration of children's affairs to develop
their own clinics and consultative services for children and parents. Gellhorn
describes the structure and use of these facilities in the activities of the Children's Court in New York City. GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE
COURTS OF NEw YORK CITY 49-148 (1954). Unfortunately, the activities of the
divorce court are generally considered as separate and independent, resulting
in the lack of integration and coordination of evaluations of the family situation. The artificial and ineffectual separation of problems of the family, and
delegation to different courts with different emphases, is nowhere more apparent than in New York City. Only a state Supreme Court has jurisdiction
over divorce. The welfare of children is the assignment of the Children's
Court, though the Supreme Court may also decide matters of custody. Matters
of material family support come within the province of the Family Court,
which, together with the Children's Court, forms the Court of Domestic Relations. Paternity proceedings are administered by the Court of Special
Sessions, a court of criminal jurisdiction. Matters of criminal behavior of
older youths may come under the administration of the Magistrates' Courts,
the Court of Special Sessions or the County Courts, all of which have jurisdiction over crime. And there are a variety of additional subdivisions within
some of these courts. GELLHORN, passim.
91. Mental hygiene and child guidance clinics are becoming increasingly
commonplace and exist in strategic locations as part of the state mental
health program in an increasing number of states. In addition, nearly every
large community has a family welfare agency where some investigative facilities and the skills of social workers may be available. These can be developed as court resources. The distribution of clinic and agency facilities is
uneven throughout the country, but these facilities may be exploited and perhaps enlarged to serve the court where they are presently available, and may
come into being where they do not yet exist.
92. The plan for a comprehensive family center to deal in integrated fashion
with the complex problems of domestic relations, is best approximated today
in the philosophy and practices of the Domestic Relations Court in Toledo
(Lucas County) Ohio, under the guidance of Judge Paul W. Alexander. Gellhorn advocates the idea of a comprehensive court for New York City as a
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knowledge can simultaneously be developed and co-ordinated. Clinical
and counseling services as a permanent component of the legal institution may provide the basis for sound practical decisions in issues
of marriage. These services may also provide large increments in our
knowledge of the purpose and experience of marriage. They thereby
offer one important kind of source material for future policy decisions
governing the regulation of marriage and divorce. The products of
experience and knowledge will also provide the sources of learning
for those who will be concerned with the administration of the
marriage process. They will be assisted in the development and definition of more useful roles. In time, both the marrying justice of the
peace and the trial judge in a conventional civil court may become
only the momentos of an earlier and less sophisticated era in the
handling of marriage and divorce. The practical adventures in learning at a family center may supplement a sensitive and sophisticated
theoretical orientation to marriage and the family at the university.
This in itself would be a marriage of enlightenment and social service. Sophisticated law and sensitively trained legal counselors and
legal decision-makers, with more adequately defined functions, can
be instrumental in more effectively bridging the gap that exists between the realities of social experience and the policies and practices of marriage and family law today.
recommendation based on his conclusions from his analysis of the operations of
GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 90, at 382-91.

the present New York City system.

